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1. Introduction 
 
         The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendements (CAAA) introduced the first large-scale cap-
and-trade program for air pollution. Title IV of the CAAA established a system of tradable 
permits for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions among utilities in the U.S. The aim of the system 
was 10 million tons per year reduction in SO2 emissions from 1980 levels by the year 2010. 
Phase I (1995-1999) of the permit market extracts emission reductions from the 263 most 
polluting  coal-fired  electricity  generating  units  with  an  output  capacity  greater  than  100 
megawatts  (MW),  belonging  to  110  power  plants  located  in  21  eastern  and  mid-western 
states. These 263 units, also called “Table A units”, are allocated a fixed number of permits 
each year sufficient for an average emission rate of 2.5 pounds SO2 per million Btu of average 
1985-1987 heat input. Power plants may select units not originally affected until phase II to 
enter the program early as substituting or compensating units to help fulfil the compliance 
obligations for “Table A units” targeted by phase I. In addition, industrial emission sources, 
such as refineries and smelters, may voluntarily enter the program if they feel they can make 
emission reductions at low cost (opt-in units). Phase II which began in the year 2000, covers 
the remaining generating units fired by coal, oil and gas with an output capacity greater than 
25 MW. Units are allocated permits sufficient for a more stringent average rate of 1.2 pounds 
of SO2 per million Btu of average 1985-1987 heat input. The SO2 permit trading program has 
dramatically reduced emissions faster and at far lower costs than anticipated, yielding wide-
ranging  environmental  and  human  health  benefits.  Thereby,  the  SO2  program’s  successes 
have encouraged policy makers in many countries to establish emissions trading schemes for 
other pollutants such as greenhouse gas emissions. 
         Since  the  passage  of  the  1990  CAAA,  several  studies  have  attempted  to  assess  the 
efficiency  of  the  SO2  permit  market  with  mixed  results.  Joskow  et  al.  (1998)  assess  the 
efficiency of the market for SO2 permits by comparing the price of permits auctioned by the 
Environmental Protection Agency
1 (EPA) between 1993 and 1997 with prices associated with 
private confidential trades. Joskow et al. (1998) discover that by late 1994 these prices were 
almost  identical  and  thereby  conclude  that  the  private  market  for  tradable  permits  was 
relatively  efficient.  Schmalensee  et  al.  (1998)  also  conclude  that  the  private  market  for 
tradable  permits  was  relatively  efficient  by  noting  the  growth  in  the  level  of  the  trading 
volume from 1995 to 1997. Ellerman et al. (2000, pp. 185-190) conclude that the flattening of 
the term structure after 1995 provides evidence of a relatively market efficiency. Carlson et al. 
(2000) find that the market failed to realize potential gains from trade in the first two years of 
phase I. Ellerman (2003) and Ellerman et al. (2003) conclude that banking has played an 
important role in improving the economic and environmental performance of SO2 cap-and-
trade program. Arimura (2003) uses the coal price data from 1985 to 1998 and estimates a 
hedonic model in order to investigate the link between sulfur premium in coal and the permit 
price. In the first two years of the program, he finds that the sulfur premium was higher than 
the permit price in the EPA auction for the range of sulfur from 0 to 0.6 pound per mmbtu. 
Arimura (2003) argues that the deviation is due to the rent exploited by coal mine companies 
in the west from the high sulfur coal. For 1997 and 1998, however, the estimation results 
show that the permit price is in the range of 95% confidence interval for sulfur premium from 
0 to 1 pound per mmbtu, suggesting that the permit price in the auction reflects the sulfur 
                                                 
1 Since 1993, an auction of approximately 2.8% of the total annual permits was conducted on behalf of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBoT). This auction is supposed to 
increase the market liquidity, to provide a price signal for private trades and to be an assured source of permit 
supply. Beginning in March 2006, CBoT decided to stop administering the auctions, resulting in EPA now 
conducting them directly. 
   2 
premium of coal for low sulfur coal. From these results, Arimura (2003) concludes that the 
market is becoming efficient in 1997 and 1998. Using an output distance function approach, 
Swinton (2002, 2004) calculates the shadow prices of emission reductions and finds that they 
diverge among some power plants, suggesting that these plants have not taken full advantage 
of  the  permit  market  during  much  of  phase  I.  Burtraw  et  al.  (2005)  suggest  that  this 
divergence  of  marginal  abatement  costs  among  some  plants  is  due  to  the  effects  of 
implementing of electricity restructuring in some states which provided incentives to reduce 
costs. Keohane (2006) uses a unit –level econometric model of technique choice, based on 
actual  decision  by  nearly  1000  units  from  1995  to  1999,  to  estimate  what  would  have 
happened  if  prescriptive  regulation  has  been  employed  in  place  of  an  emissions  trading 
scheme. The results show that cost savings appear to have been lower than estimated by 
others,  noting  that  under  the  most  natural  choices  of  counterfactual  regulations,  the  cost 
savings from trading, relative to a uniform emissions standard, ranged from $148 to $268 
million annually: a cost savings of 16% to 25%. Ellerman and Montero (2007) show that the 
aggregate behavior of the SO2 bank indicates that most participants have made reasonably 
efficient abatement decisions during the period 1995-2002. Helfand et al. (2007) discover that 
although the SO2 price path does not reflect the Hotteling rule, profit opportunities appear 
relatively small and quite risky. They suggest that the SO2 permit market appears to have been 
relatively efficient during the period 1994-2003.  
          However, research on SO2 market efficiency from a financial market perspective is 
rather sparse. This is unfortunate given the characteristics of these trading permits which are 
similar  to  those  of  financial  assets  and  energy.  Indeed,  the  trading  permits  are  perfectly 
homogeneous, like the financial assets
2, and their transaction does not generate transport and 
storage fees. In addition, as in the markets of energy, supply and demand of utilities covered 
by  emissions  trading  scheme  are  stochastic  and  react  to  the  change  of  permit  price 
fundamentals such as the weather risk, the technological innovation in reducing emissions and 
fuel switching (Beaumais et al., 2008). Albrecht et al. (2006) examine the efficiency of the 
U.S SO2 permit market from an informational point of view. They find that the random walk 
hypothesis and the economic profitable predictability are rejected, suggesting that the SO2 
market is weakly efficient.  This paper constitutes –to our best knowledge– the first empirical 
analysis investigating long-run and short-run efficiency in the U.S SO2 permit futures market 
with respect to its ability to unbiasedly predict future spot prices, using cointegration and 
error-correction models. Empirical results show that the market is inefficient, suggesting the 
presence of profitable arbitrage opportunities among U.S SO2 permit prices. In light of our 
findings, we recommend that market actors consider warily the information incorporated in 
SO2 futures prices. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, the 
methodology is described while in section 3 the data are presented. Empirical results and 




         A market is called efficient if prices always fully reflect available information (Fama, 
1970).  Hence,  the  opportunity  for  any  abnormal  gain  on  the  basis  on  the  information 
contained in historical prices is eliminated.  
         If market actors are risk neutral, then the current futures price should equal the expected 
future spot price with contract maturity. This implies: 
                                                 
2 Kosobud et al. (2005) demonstrate empirically that SO2 permits have rates of return and yield distribution that 
make them an asset option for inclusion in a risk diversified portfolio. 
   3 
1 1 - - = t t t F S E                                                                                                                              (1) 
where  t t S E 1 -  is the expectation of the future spot price formed in period t-1, and  1 - t F  is the 
futures  price  with  contract  maturity  in  period  t.  Assuming  rational  expectations,  so  that 
t t t t t S E S m + W = - - ) ( 1 1 , where  1 - Wt represents the information set available in period t-1,  t m is 
a rational expectations error and  t m is orthogonal to all element in  1 - Wt , including lagged 
forecast errors, the hypothesis of efficiency (unbiasedness) is then tested by the following 
model: 
t t t F S m b a + + = -1                                                                                                                    (2) 
        The null hypothesis to be tested is the regression coefficients of the constant term and the 
futures  price  should  not  be  statistically  different  from  zero  and  one, 
respectively[ ] ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( = b a . This cannot be tested using standard regression analysis as price 
time series exhibit a non –stationary behavior. To avoid spurious regression results, the notion 
of cointegration can be used. According to Engle and Granger (1987), a linear combination of 
two or more non-stationary series (with the same order of integration) may be stationary. If 
such a stationary linear combination exists, the series are considered to be cointegrated and 
long-run equilibrium relationships exist.  
         Prior to proceeding with the cointegration test, we determine the order of integration of 
the variables and ensure that it is equal to one (I (1)) for each of the futures and spot price 
series.  The  conventional  unit  root  tests  namely  Augmented  Dickey–Fuller  (1979,  1981) 
(ADF), Phillips–Perron (1987) (PP) and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (1992) (KPSS) 
are used to test for the stationarity of the series. However, Perron (1989) shows that usual unit 
root tests are subject to misspecification bias and size distortion when the series involved has 
undergone structural breaks leading to spurious acceptance of the unit root hypothesis. We 
overcome this limitation by also using Zivot and Andrews (1992) procedure to endogenously 
determine a break point and test for the presence of a unit root when the series have a broken 
trend. 
         In order to assess the dynamics of the U.S SO2 futures markets and the corresponding 
spot  markets,  the  Engle  and  Granger  (1987)  cointegration  approach  is  implemented.  The 
Engle-Granger method consists in estimating the cointegrating regression (eq.3) by ordinary 









1 ˆ ˆ ˆ                                                                                                     (3) 
where  t u ˆ D includes the  t m  sequence and with the null hypothesis of 0 : 0 = f H . The value of 
optimal lag length p is selected by the smallest Akaike information criterion or Schwartz 
Bayesian criterion. Since the residual series are calculated from a cointegrating equation, an 
intercept and time trend are not considered in the equation. The test statistics obtained is then 
compared  against  critical  values  in  the  table  generated  by  Engle  and  Yoo  (1987).  If  the 
variables  are  found  to  be  cointegrated  then  some  linear  combination  of  them  will  be 
stationary. This means that there exists a long-run relationship among them.  
         If St and Ft-1 are cointegrated and the joint restrictions hold in eq. (2), this implies that 
long-run unbiasedness and hence efficiency is substantiated. However, in the short-run it is 
possible  that  deviations  exist  from  the  long-run  equilibrium  relationship.  Such  short-run 
deviations would lead to both market inefficiency  and speculative profit opportunities for 
arbitrageurs. Short-run efficiency can be tested using an error correction model (ECM) which 
captures the short-run dynamics of spot and futures prices. In our case, the ECM takes the 











- - - -
1 0
, 1 1 1                                                      (4) 
where  D  is  the  difference  operator,  k  and  l  are  the  numbers  of  lags,  t h is  the  serially 
uncorrelated error terms, and  1 1) ( - - - t t F S  is the lagged error correction term (ECT), which is 
derived from the cointegration relationship and represents the deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium for the two prices. Thus, deviations in this period’s price vary in relation to past 
disequilibria. Short term efficiency requires the following conditions to be satisfied: 
i.  0 = w  
ii.  1 0 = d  
iii.  1 - = g  
iv.  all other d and j  = 0. 
If the four conditions are met, then markets are efficient and futures prices provide unbiased 




         The data used in this analysis are daily spot and futures prices for U.S SO2 trading 
permits and are sourced from the Chicago Climate Futures Exchange (CCFE)
3. Standards 
contracts  are  25  tons  of  SO2  emission  permits.  The  spot  closing  prices  for  permits  are 
collected on the OTC market and are calculated as an average of bids to buy and offers to sell 
for  current  vintages  of  permits.  Nine  futures  contracts  for  delivery  at  maturities  from 
December 2006 to 2014 are considered in the present study and the futures prices are matched 
with the corresponding spot prices. Sample lengths are December 10, 2004 – December 29, 
2006 (SO2 Dec 06 contract, 536 observations), December 10, 2004 – December 31, 2007 
(SO2 Dec 07 contract, 797 observations), December 10, 2004 – August 29, 2008 (SO2 Dec 08 
contract, 971 observations) and May 17, 2006 – August 29, 2008 (SO2 Dec 09, Dec10, Dec 
11, Dec 12, Dec 13 and Dec 14 contracts; 598 observations). As is customary in this type of 
analysis, all variables are used in their natural logarithms. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Testing for non-stationarity 
 
        An important first step in the analysis is to test the stationarity of the spot and futures 
price series. To ascertain the order of integration, we first used the conventional unit root 
tests. As shown in Table 1, the results of ADF, PP and KPSS unit root tests for levels and first 
differences show that none of the estimated variables are stationary while their differences are 
I (0). The results support the contention that futures and spot prices for the U.S SO2 permits 
are I (1). Next the Zivot and Andrews unit root test is used in the analysis, which treats 
endogenously the presence of a structural break in the series. Table 4 reports the minimum t-
statistics from testing the stationarity assuming a break in mean for the first differences of 
each futures and spot price series. The results confirm those from the conventional unit root 
tests that all series are I (1). The estimated breakpoints for futures prices of the contract for 
Dec  06  delivery  and  their  corresponding  spot  prices  are  26/01/2006  and  25/01/2006, 
respectively. The timings of these breakpoints are related to the downward adjustments of the  
 
                                                 
3 New Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) also provides SO2 futures contracts. The use of data from the CCFE is 
justified by the high degree of liquidity in this trading platform.    5 
Table 1. Results of conventional unit root tests 
 
  ADF  PP  KPSS 
Level  First difference  Level  First 
difference 




Series  Lag  Test 
statistic 
Lag  Test statistic  Test 
statistic 
Test statistic  Test statistic  Test 
statistic 
Dec 06  1  -0.840 (1)  0  -21.522** (1)  -0.662 (1)  -22.498**  (1)  0.824** (2)  0.353 (2) 
Spot  2  -0.690 (1)  1  -13.522** (1)  -0.613 (1)  -18.985** (1)  0.834** (2)  0.347 (2) 
Dec 07  1  -0.572 (1)  0  -27.071** (1)  -0.476 (1)  -27.480**  (1)  1.683** (2)  0.141 (2) 
Spot  2  -0.454 (1)  1  -17.632** (1)  -0.413 (1)  -24.648**  (1)  1.698** (2)  0.137 (2) 
Dec 08  2  -1.124 (1)  1  -19.071** (1)  -1.101(1)   -28.703** (1)  2.390** (2)  0.223 (2) 
Spot  1  -1.232 (1)  0  -30.327** (1)  -1.108 (1)  -30.713** (1)  2.462** (2)  0.234 (2) 
Dec 09  2  -1.009 (1)  1  -14.991** (1)  -0.972 (1)  -21.318** (1)  1.724** (2)  0.208 (2) 
Dec 10  1  -1.217 (1)  0  -23.317** (1)  -1.137 (1)  -23.020** (1)  1.851** (2)  0.259 (2) 
Dec 11  1  -1.046 (1)  0  -30.368** (1)  -0.871 (1)  -30.396** (1)  1.776** (2)  0.226 (2) 
Dec 12  1  -1.159 (1)  0  -23.875** (1)  -0.945 (1)  -23.887** (1)  1.750** (2)  0.364 (2) 
Dec 13  2  -1.130 (1)  1  -16.291** (1)  -0.876 (1)  -21.962** (1)  1.794** (2)  0.371 (2) 
Dec 14  2  -1.052 (1)  1  -16.545** (1)   -0.776 (1)  -22.298** (1)  1.717** (2)  0.403 (2) 
Spot  1  -1.203 (1)  0  -24.391** (1)  -1.107 (1)  -24.525** (1)  1.626** (2)  0.191 (2) 
Notes: ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. PP: Phillips-Perron test. KPSS: Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–
Shin. (1): Model without constant or deterministic trend. (2): Model with constant, without deterministic trend. 
The optimal lag structure is determined by the Durbin Watson test. If the regression model includes lagged 
dependent variables as explanatory variables, we use the Durbin’s h test.   ADF and PP critical values are taken 
from MacKinnon (1991). KPSS critical values are sourced from Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). All null hypotheses 
except KPSS are unit root; while, in KPSS null is stationarity. ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 
5% significance level. 
 
Table 2. Zivot-Andrews minimum t-statistics 
 
Series  t-statistic  Period 
Dec 06  -2.714 (4)  26/01/2006 
Spot  -2.838 (4)  25/01/2006 
Dec 07  -2.947 (4)  28/03/2006 
Spot  -3.134 (5)  01/02/2006 
Dec 08  -2.595 (5)  01/02/2008 
Spot  -2.530 (5)  04/02/2008 
Dec 09  -3.812 (3)  23/04/2008 
Dec 10  -3.555 (3)  13/04/2007 
Dec 11  -3.589 (3)  13/04/2007 
Dec 12  -3.232 (3)  09/04/2007 
Dec 13  -3.354 (3)  09/04/2007 
Dec 14  -3.379 (3)  09/04/2007 
Spot  -3.801 (3)  24/04/2008 
∆Dec 06  -8.669***  (4)  09/12/2005 
∆Spot  -9.629***  (3)  08/12/2005 
∆Dec 07  -12.799*** (3)  24/01/2006 
∆Spot  -12.456*** (3)  08/12/2005 
∆Dec 08  -13.102*** (4)  08/01/2007 
∆Spot  -13.209*** (4)  08/01/2007 
∆Dec 09  -10.953*** (4)  08/01/2007 
∆Dec 10  -13.432*** (2)  08/01/2007 
∆Dec 11  -22.930*** (0)  08/01/2007 
∆Dec 12  -24.120*** (0)  08/01/2007 
                                                                                                                                       Continued on the next page 
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Table 2. Continued 
 
∆Dec 13  -11.859*** (3)  08/01/2007 
∆Dec 14  -12.015*** (3)  08/01/2007 
∆Spot  -10.838*** (4)  08/01/2007 
Notes: All t-statistics estimated from a break in intercept model. Values in parentheses are lag lengths used in the 




expected  marginal  cost  of  reducing  SO2  emissions  under  the  Clean  Air  Interstate  Rule
4 
(CAIR)  as  buyers  and  sellers  more  completely  assess  market  fundamentals  and  to  the 
dramatically increase of temperature on January 2006, which was the warmest January on 
record. The estimated breakpoints for futures prices of the contract for Dec 07 delivery and 
their corresponding spot prices are 28/03/2006 and 01/02/2006, respectively. The timings of 
these structural breaks are explained by their proximity to the dramatically rise of temperature 
on  January  2006  and  to  the  downward  adjustments  by  the  market  actors  of  the  expected 
marginal cost of reducing SO2 emissions under CAIR. The estimated breakpoints for futures 
prices of the contract for Dec 08 delivery and their corresponding spot prices are 01/02/2008 
and  04/02/2008,  respectively.  The  timings  of  these  breakpoints  are  explained  by  their 
proximity to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the district of Columbia 
Circuit vacating the Clean Air Mercury Rule on February 8, 2008. The estimated breakpoints 
for  futures  prices  of  the  contracts  for  Dec  09,  Dec10,  Dec11,  Dec12,  Dec13  and  Dec14 
deliveries  and  their  corresponding  spot  prices  are  23/04/2008,  13/04/2007,  13/04/2007, 
09/04/2007, 09/04/2007, 0904/2007, and 24/04/2008, respectively. While the timings of the 
estimated  breakpoints  of  futures  prices  of  the  contract  for  Dec  09  delivery  and  their 
corresponding spot prices are explained by their proximity to the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the district of Columbia Circuit invalidating the Clean Air Mercury 
Rule
5 (CAMR), the timings of the estimated breakpoint of futures prices of contracts for 
delivery  at  matunities  from  Dec  10  to  Dec  14  and  their  corresponding  spot  prices  are 
explained by their proximity to the supreme court decision on April 2, 2007, which named 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as air pollutants as defined in the Clean Air Act 
and therefore authorized the EPA to regulate greenhouse emissions from new automobiles 
and trucks. 
 
4.2. Testing for cointegration 
 
         Having established that all of the futures and spot prices are I (1), we now proceed to the 
cointegration analysis. For each model, we include dummy variables in order to take into 
account possible structural changes and therefore to filter outliers in the time series. Three 
dummy variables taking respectively the value of 1 in November, 2005, December, 2005 and 
January, 2006 and zero otherwise are included in Dec 06 model. These dummy variables 
account for the downward adjustments by the market actors of the marginal cost of reducing 
SO2 emissions under CAIR. A dummy variable taking the value of 1 from January 24, 2006 to 
February  28,  2006  and  0  otherwise  is  included  in  Dec  07  model  and  accounts  for  the 
                                                 
4 On March 10, 2005, following the success of the CAAA of 1990, the EPA promulgated the CAIR that would 
dramatically reduce the SO2 emissions that move across state boundaries in the 28 Eastern states and the District 
of Columbia in 2010 by over 70 percent in 2015 from 2003 levels. 
5 The Clean  Air Mercury  Rule, finalized on May 18, 2005 builds upon the CAIR to  permanently cap and 
significantly reduce mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants, the largest remaining sources of mercury 
emissions in the USA, by nearly 70 percent from 1999 emission levels.   7 
downward adjustments by the market actors of the marginal cost of reducing SO2 emissions 
under CAIR. Two dummy variables taking respectively the value of 1 in February, 2008 and 
from July 11, 2008 to August 11, 2008 and 0 otherwise are included in the rest of models. 
These dummy variables account for the vacation of the Clean Air Mercury Rule and the Clean 
Air Interstate Rule, respectively.  The test results are reported in Table 3. In all models, we 
clearly  reject  the  null  of  no  cointegration  at  5%  level.  Thus  each  of  the  futures  and  the 
corresponding  spot  price  series  for  each  of  the  time  spreads  are  cointegrated  at  the  5% 
significance level. 
 
Table 3. Engle and Granger cointegration test 
 
Models  ADF  p 
Dec 06 futures and spot price series  -6.195  3 
Dec 07 futures and spot price series  -4.379  3 
Dec 08 futures and spot price series  -3.970  4 
Dec 09 futures and spot price series  -3.446  2 
Dec 10 futures and spot price series  -4.840  1 
Dec 11 futures and spot price series  -4.366  2 
Dec 12 futures and spot price series  -3.803  1 
Dec 13 futures and spot price series  -3.589  1 
Dec 14 futures and spot price series  -5.237  0 
Note: The 5% critical values are -3.37 (p=0) and -3.25 (p=4) (Engle and yoo, 1987). Lag lengths p are selected 
by the smallest Akaike Information criterion. 
 
4.3. Testing the unbiased expectations hypothesis 
 
       The nature of the long-run relationships from the cointegrating vectors is examined by 
testing the restrictions placed on eq. (2); that is the null hypothesis is  0 = a  and 1 = b . Table 
4  reports  the  estimated  coefficients  of  the  cointegrating  vectors  and  test  statistics  of  the 
unbiased expectations hypothesis.  
        The  null  hypothesis  of  unbiasedness  is  rejected  at  the  5%  significance  level  for  all 
contracts.  This  result  supports  the  contention  that  SO2  futures  contracts  for  delivery  at 
maturities from December 2006 to 2014 are biased predictors of the subsequent spot prices. 
This is consistent with a long-run inefficiency and a risk-premium paid to speculators. 
           
Table 4. Wald test of parameter restrictions on the cointegrating vectors 
 
  a ˆ   b ˆ   Testing   0 = a  
and 1 = b  
Testing  0 = a   Testing  1 = b  





Dec 06  0.153  0.974  129.99  0.000  24.702  0.000  29.741  0.000 
Dec 07  -0.103  1.011  414.448  0.000  20.745  0.000  10.304  0.001 
Dec 08  -0.015  0.995  663.786  0.000  0.547  0.460  2.464  0.117 
Dec 09  0.172  0.958  1790.013  0.000  27.327  0.000  65.292  0.000 
Dec 10  -0.435  1.160  17515.35  0.000  53.228  0.000  234.631  0.000 
Dec 11  -0.482  1.171  11129.24  0.000  37.517  0.000  153.051  0.000 
Dec 12  -0.129  1.110  8578.030  0.000  2.189  0.000  5264.99  0.000 
Dec 13  -0.121  1.110  7632.054  0.000  1.653  0.199  44.142  0.000 
Dec 14  -0.089  1.105  6785.151  0.000  0.772  0.379  34.896  0.000 
   8 
          We test individually the hypothesis that  0 = a  and 1 = b  in order to determine whether 
the rejection of the joint hypothesis for these contracts was driven by the presence of a risk 
premium or a bias in the futures prices. Results in table 4 show that the hypothesis that  0 = a  
and 1 = b  is rejected separately for all contracts, except for contact for delivery in Dec 08. 
These results imply complex interaction between expectations and a possible risk premium, 
which occur in the process of the futures prices formation for these time spreads. In the light 
of these findings, we suggest that speculative opportunities seem to exist for these futures 
contracts. 
           In general, it would not be expected that a market which was not exhibiting long-run 
efficiency would also not be short-run efficient. Hence, it would be assumed that all contracts 
would also not be short-run efficient. Eq. (4) was estimated for the nine contracts and the 
coefficients are tested to verify if they are consistent with the criteria noted in section 2. The 
results  of  these  estimations  are  reported  in  Table  5
6.  On  the  basis  of  F-statistics,  the 
restrictions that 0 = w ,  1 0 = = b d and  1 - = g were tested separately. The estimated values of 
w  are insignificantly different from zero for all contracts. The p-values of Wald statistics for 
the restriction  1 0 = d  are such that the restriction can be rejected at the 5% level for contracts 
for Dec06, Dec07, Dec08, Dec11, Dec12 and Dec 14 deliveries. The estimated values of  g  
are significantly different from -1 for all contracts. A joint test of all three restrictions is also 
performed using Wald test. The results confirm the general pattern of those from analyzing 
the restrictions individually. These results strongly suggest that there are short-run deviations 
from the long-run efficiency conditions and therefore the existence of a short-run inefficiency.  
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                                                                                                                                         Continued on the next page 
                                                 
6 For each model, we include dummy variables in order to take into account possible structural changes and 
therefore to filter outliers in the time series. Two dummy variables taking respectively the value of 1 from 
1/24/2006 to 2/28/2006 and from 4/24/2006 to 05/26/2006 and zero otherwise are included in Dec 06 and Dec 07 
models in order to account for the downward adjustments by the market actors of the marginal cost of reducing 
SO2 emissions under CAIR. Two dummy variables taking the value of 1 from 1/24/2006 to 28/2/2006 and from 
7/3/2006  to  7/31/2006  and  zero  otherwise  are  included  in  Dec  08  and  Dec  09  models,  respectively.  These 
dummy variables account for the downward adjustments by the market actors of the marginal cost of reducing 
SO2 emissions under CAIR. A dummy variable taking the value of 1 from 07/11/2008 to 07/31/2008 and 0 
otherwise is included in Dec 10, Dec 11, Dec 12, Dec 13 and Dec 14 models in order to take into account the 
court decision striking down the Clean Air Interstate Rule. 
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Table 5. Continued 
 





























         This paper extends the literature investigating the efficiency in the U.S. SO2 permit 
market by testing the hypothesis of unbiasedness of futures prices in both the long-and short-
run  using  the  cointegration  approach.  We  find  that  U.S  SO2  permits  futures  prices  are 
cointegrated with subsequent spot prices for nine contracts for delivery at maturities from 
December 2006 to 2014. Spot and futures prices are determined by the same fundamentals 
and so cointegration implies the existence of one long-run relationship between futures price 
series and the corresponding spot prices across all of these time spreads. 
         While the presence of cointegration between spot and futures prices by itself fulfils a 
necessary condition for market efficiency but not sufficient condition for the unbiasedness of 
futures prices. Hence the unbiased expectations hypotheses are tested for all contracts and the 
results reveal that markets are inefficient and futures prices provide biased estimates of future 
spot prices in the long-run and the short-run. These findings support the existence of a risk 
premium  and  speculative  opportunities  for  arbitrageurs  and  can  be  explained  by  the 
Keynesian theory of normal backwardation. According to Keynes (1930), futures prices are 
unreliable estimates of expected future spot prices. This implies that even if future spot price 
is expected to remain the same as the current spot price, the futures price will be below the 
expected spot price by an amount equal to a risk premium. This risk premium is paid by 
hedgers because this reduces risk to the hedger, just as it adds to the risk for speculator. 
Keynes’ suggestion is based upon the argument that the long (short) speculator realizes the 
premium by refusing to purchase a contract from the short (long) hedger except at a price 
below (above) that which the futures price is expected to approach.  
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